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BANKRUPTCY’S ROLE IN THE GROWING DILEMMA OF 
SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 
ABSTRACT 
The coal industry is experiencing increasing market challenges and many 
of our nation’s largest coal producers are filing for bankruptcy. In the wake of 
insolvency, coal companies are leaving behind abandoned mines with no one 
to mitigate the damage. There are long-standing regulations mandating coal 
companies post bonds for land restoration after mining operations are 
complete. Coal companies can use financial liquidity to satisfy these bonds, 
known as self-bonding. Yet, companies are using the fiscal strength of 
subsidiaries instead of their own accounts to self-bond. Ultimately, a company 
can appear financially healthy enough to qualify for reclamation bonds, but 
not have enough cash to cover full clean-up of mining sites. Bankruptcy 
highlights the insufficiency of such reclamation procedures and the supporting 
bonding process.  
This Comment evaluates several ways to cope with the self-bonding 
problem under the existing bankruptcy framework, including the existing 
requirements of the good faith and feasibility requirements, and proposes a 
carved out exception within the Bankruptcy Code disallowing prior coal 
bankruptcy debtors from self-bonding. The carve-out offers the most effective 
solution at targeting only the misuse of bankruptcy while still allowing the 
institution to provide effective relief to innocent debtors. The proposed carve-
out states: No coal company seeking relief under or arising from this statute 
shall: (a) include self-bonding within its reorganization plan, nor (b) qualify 
for self-bonding in the future under any provision of 30 C.F.R. § 800.23.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Coal companies are experiencing various market pressures pushing them 
toward bankruptcy. Growing insolvency of the mining industry leaves 
environmental degradation for the government to clean-up. While the current 
safeguards are meant to protect land previously mined for coal from being 
abandoned, there remains a loophole. Applicable regulations require an active 
coal mining site to be able to pay to remediate the land once mining activities 
have ceased. There are various ways a coal company can post these mandatory 
“reclamation bonds.” One way, known as self-bonding, allows a company to 
use its financial strength to show the company does not need to set aside 
specific funds because it is solvent enough to foot the bill. But coal companies 
can escape responsibility by falsely reporting the financial ability to pay for the 
clean-up, and later seek to be absolved of that obligation through bankruptcy. 
There are various ways in which bankruptcy can discourage self-bonding 
by a coal company currently or previously in bankruptcy. This Comment will 
explore potential remedies offered through bankruptcy procedures, either in the 
existing Code, an amended Code, or through court discretion. One 
recommendation is that a court could deny a reorganization plan that includes 
self-bonding under the reasoning that it does not satisfy all of the plan 
confirmation requirements.1 Specifically, self-bonding does not satisfy the 
good faith and feasibility requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) and 
§ 1129(a)(11).2 The ideal solution will be a court-created, or Code-amended 
carve out that explicitly prohibits a previous debtor in bankruptcy to avail 
themselves of self-bonding again. The carve-out would prevent companies 
with a history of abusing the reclamation bonding scheme while allowing other 
companies with no such history to continue to self-bond responsibly. 
Alternatively, bankruptcy courts could suggest changes either in support of the 
Department of the Interior’s notice and comment process, or for Congress to 
change the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) entirely. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Coal played an integral role in the expansion and the success of the United 
States economy by powering transportation, electricity, and the Industrial 
 
 1 In order to get an approved reorganization plan in chapter 11, a debtor must satisfy all sixteen 
separate confirmation requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012). 
 2 See 11 U.S.C § 1129(a)(3) (2012). 
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Revolution.3 The coal industry gave many Americans employment in a time 
where the country needed it the most.4 Unfortunately, the negative effects of 
the industry on the environment and human health eventually became 
apparent.5 A statement given to the Committee on Natural Resources in 2013 
recalled the physical destruction caused by coal mining:  
During the mid 1970s, most counties in the Appalachian coal fields 
were dotted with hundreds of small surface mines . . . . From both the 
small and large operations I saw streams choked with sediment, and 
spoil and rocks dumped on the downslope in steep terrain. I 
witnessed the results of unpredictable blasting events and saw the 
exposed highwalls and abandoned entries that were left behind.6 
A. The Harms of Coal Mining  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged with protecting 
human health and the environment, attributes the growing consequences of 
climate change to the greenhouse gas effect, primarily from emissions of 
carbon dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels.7 In fact, carbon dioxide 
(CO2), a major byproduct of coal consumption, “is the primary greenhouse gas 
pollutant, accounting for nearly three-quarters of global greenhouse gas 
emissions and 84% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”8 The effects of climate 
change have become so severe that 2016 was the hottest year in recorded 
history, beating out 2015.9 This increase in temperature is also accompanied by 
 
 3 See A Brief History of Coal Use, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www.fossil.enegry.gov/ 
education/energylessons/coal/coalhistory.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2017). Coal use expanded during the 
Industrial Revolution to power steamships and steam-powered railroads, the chief forms of transportation, 
which used coal to fuel their boilers. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977: A 30th Anniversary Review, 
Statement of Earl Bandy, Chief, Applicant Violator System Office, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSM), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES (July 25, 
2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37013/html/CHRG-110hhrg37013.htm. 
 6 Id.  
 7 See Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017 
snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/causes-climate-change.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).  
 8 Learn About Carbon Pollution From Power Plants, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2017). 
 9 See NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-data-show-2016-warmest-year-
on-record-globally (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
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changes in the weather and overall climate of Earth.10 According to the EPA, 
“many places have seen changes in rainfall, resulting in more floods, droughts, 
or intense rain, as well as more frequent and severe heat waves.”11 The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has also identified various health 
effects correlated with severe weather, air pollution, water quality degradation, 
extreme heat, food supply impacts and environmental degradation as a 
whole.12  
In an effort to reduce CO2 emissions and combat the effects of climate 
change, nations across the globe have signed the Paris Agreement.13 The 
United States is the only country to reject the treaty and maintain the status quo 
of emissions.14 But American coal is still in danger. While Washington debates 
climate change, global demand for coal is already declining.15 American coal 
companies optimistically relied on the increase in demand for coal by 
industrializing countries such as China and Australia.16 However, the line of 
growth in coal consumption is not quite the predicted straight line.17 In fact, 
coal demand for exports has not even remained constant; it has declined.18 As 
countries across the world become more aware of environmental degradation, 
they are demanding less coal use and increasing their own reliance on 
renewable energy sources instead.19 The United States is losing export 
 
 10 See Climate Change: Basic Information, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https:// 
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climagechange/climate-change-basic-information.html (last visited Sept. 3, 
2017).  
 11 Id. 
 12 See id. (“The health effects of these disruptions include increased respiratory and cardiovascular 
disease, injuries and premature deaths related to extreme weather events, changes in the prevalence and 
geographical distribution of food- and water-borne illnesses and other infectious diseases, and threats to mental 
health.”).  
 13 See Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http:// 
unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 
2017).  
 14 See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.html. 
 15 See Coal Production Declines in 2016, With Average Coal Prices Below their 2015 Level, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
29472. 
 16 See Australia, PEABODY ENERGY, http:www.peadboydenergy.com/content/398/austrial-mining (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2017). 
 17 See Coal Production Declines, supra note 15. 
 18 See U.S. Coal Exports Declined 23% in 2015, as Coal Imports Remained Steady, U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25252.  
 19 See Hydroelectric Plants Account for More than 70% of Brazil’s Electric Generation, U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27472. 
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business.20 Recent data shows that in 2014, China not only used more crude oil 
and natural gas, but also used less coal.21  
When it comes to the impact of coal mining, perhaps even more troubling 
are the diseases cited by the CDC that plague individuals who live and work in 
coal towns and inhale mine dust.22 These diseases include: pneumoconiosis, 
silicosis, bronchitis, emphysema, and Black Lung.23 Combined, these diseases 
have led to thousands of deaths and left countless others with severely 
diminished qualities of life.24 Even in light of the dangers, coal companies 
have not felt the need to mitigate the damage caused by their industry. The 
environment and its inhabitants continue to suffer due to coal mining even in 
an age of environmental consciousness and scientific awareness. One 
unfortunate consequence of the coal industry’s negative externalities is the 
increase of ghost towns caused by rampant unemployment. 
Consider the coal mining town of Lindytown, West Virginia. According to 
Sierra Club, Appalachian mountaintop-removal mines have destroyed an 
estimated 1.4 million acres of forested land, buried an estimated 2,000 miles of 
streams, poisoned drinking water, and wiped whole towns off the map.25 
Lindytown is on its way to being another statistic as it has experienced both the 
“boom” and “bust” of surface coal mining.26 Lindytown is located in southwest 
West Virginia and was surrounded by mountains and forests, until coal mining 
began.27 Residents initially thrived off of the introduced industry; families 
throughout the town had both employment and a purpose.28 But the labor-
intensive underground mining eventually transitioned to machine operated 
surface mining.29 Residents were left unemployed while health and safety 
conditions continued to deteriorate due to daily blasting and visible coal dust.30 
 
 20 See U.S. Coal Exports Declined, supra note 18. 
 21 See Oil and Natural Gas Import Reliance of Major Economies Projected to Change Rapidly, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
14691. 
 22 See Jay Colinet, Health Effects of Overexposure to Respirable Silica Dust, SILICA DUST CONTROL 
WORKSHOP (Sept. 28, 2010) https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/UserFiles/workshops/silicaMNM2010/1-
Colinet-HealthEffects.pdf. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 The Cost of Coal, SIERRA CLUB, http://vault.sierraclub.org/sierra/costofcoal/west-virginia/default. 
aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).  
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See Dan Barry, As the Mountaintops Fall, a Coal Town Vanishes, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/us/13lindytown.html. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. 
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Instead of helping the community, the occupant coal company at the time, 
Massey Energy, chose to reduce its liability by simply buying out residents that 
had lived in Lindytown for generations.31 The large coal company began 
making offers in December 2008, and by the beginning of 2011, only one or 
two families remained in the entire town.32 The holdouts consist of a 
generation unwilling to leave their family homes, including Alzheimer’s 
sufferer Quinnie Richmond and her son.33 Yet none of the remaining residents 
blame the younger generation for getting out. They suggest, “[y]ou might as 
well take the money and get rid of your torment . . . after they destroyed our 
place.”34 Clearly, coal mining has immense economic and social externalities.  
B. Self-Bonding and Bankruptcy 
Lindytown is just one example within one region of coal mining. 
Lindytown’s plight is an unfortunate paradigm found throughout Appalachia 
and coal mining towns across the nation. If the coal industry remains afloat in 
the face of such degradation, what protections are available to the remaining 
employees and residents of coal towns in the instance of coal company 
bankruptcy? Their only hope rests with decades old legislation. In 1977, 
President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977.35 Under SMCRA regulations, before mining 
operations begin, a coal company must apply for and pay reclamation 
performance bonds to guarantee its ability to restore and clean-up mining sites 
after use.36 There are several allowable types of bonds, including collateral and 
surety bonds.37 Financially stable coal companies, however, are allowed to 
“self-bond” for these environmental clean-up liabilities by showing they can 
afford to clean-up mining sites when the time comes.38 That is, fiscally healthy 
coal companies are allowed to guarantee reclamation obligations without any 
type of collateralized financial assurance.39  
 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See generally 30 C.F.R. § 800.12 (2012). 
 36 See generally id. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See generally id. § 800.12(c).  
 39 See id. § 800.23(b)(3) (“To meet the financial requirement, the Act requires an applicant to either (1) 
have an “A” or higher rating from Moody’s Investor Service or Standard and Poor’s Cooperation; (2) a 
tangible net worth of $10 million, a ratio of total liabilities to net worth or 2.5 or less, and a ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or greater; or (3) fixed U.S. assets of at least $20 million, a ratio of total 
liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a ration of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or 
greater.”).  
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Self-bonding worked well when coal was a booming and resilient business, 
because companies were financially stable enough to maintain sufficient funds 
for reclamation. In fact, maintaining liquidity of funds, that otherwise would 
have been set aside for reclamation bonds, allowed American coal companies 
to thrive and stay competitive in the global market.40 Self-bonding has become 
so popular that there are approximately $3.86 billion in outstanding self-bond 
obligations across the United States.41 From a business perspective, that means 
billions of dollars are not tied up in reclamation bonds that corporations can 
use to reinvest and grow.  
But growth alone is not the issue. As coal companies expand operations, 
the effects on the environment and human health will compound, especially if 
mines are abandoned and land is left un-reclaimed.42 Environmental harm 
resulting from growth of the coal industry is twofold. First, coal mining results 
in severe environmental impact including air pollution from dust, groundwater 
pollution from mine runoff, and safety concerns associated with abandoned 
mines.43 Second, the burning of coal at power plants also creates a myriad of 
externalities such as an increase of atmospheric CO2 and other pollutants that 
impact global and human health.44 
To make matters worse for the coal industry, it had been experiencing 
problems with coal demand even before the bad publicity of climate change. 
Some of the factors contributing to the decline in demand for coal include 
lower natural gas prices, lower international demand, and reduced domestic 
energy use due to warming temperatures. 45 Moreover, the United States’ final 
coal production in 2016 projects have been seventeen percent lower than in 
2015—the lowest level since 1978.46 This single year decrease in production is 
not an isolated event. Coal production has dropped in every major coal region 
by at least fifteen percent—a continuation of an eight-year decline from peak 
production in 2008.47 Additionally, a report by the Carbon Tracker Initiative 
 
 40 Australia, supra note 16 (coal companies can use the extra liquidity to invest in foreign markets 
rather than be tied up by bonds).  
 41 Jayni Foley Hein et al., Self-Bonding in an Era of Coal Bankruptcy: Recommendations for Reform, 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/files/ 
publications/Coal_Self-Bonding_Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).  
 42 See generally Climate Effects on Health, supra note 42. 
 43 See generally id. 
 44 See Climate Change Decreases Quality of the Air We Breathe, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/pubs/air-quality-final_508.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
 45 See Coal Production Declines, supra note 15. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 12/12/2017 11:32 AM 
212 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
found that more than 260 mines closed between 2001 and 2013, and just since 
2009, the market value of the U.S. coal sector has dropped by seventy-six 
percent.48  
Competitors like natural gas and renewable energy also have a large impact 
on coal production. Natural gas, although still a fossil fuel, has a carbon 
intensity eighty-two percent lower than that of coal. 49 Not only is natural gas a 
cleaner alternative to coal, it is becoming increasingly cheaper.50 With lower 
prices, cleaner emissions, and more efficient extraction,51 natural gas is simply 
outcompeting coal. In 2015, natural gas consumption was eighty-one percent 
higher than coal consumption, and “in 2016, natural gas surpassed coal as the 
primary fuel used for power generation in the United States, supplying an 
estimated 34% of the nation’s electricity, compared with 30% for coal.”52  
Renewable energies are also becoming a more prominent player in the 
energy market. In 2015, the share of renewable energy consumption in the 
United States was at almost ten percent, the largest proportion since the 
1930s.53 While almost all renewables have seen an increase, solar and wind 
generation have seen the greatest growth for electricity generation.54 The 
growing percentage of renewables is also not a function of declining sources of 
fossil fuels; for the third year in a row, more than half of new additions to the 
power grid are renewable technologies, again with a large increase of wind and 
 
 48 Andrew Grant & Luke Sussams, The U.S. Coal Crash: Evidence for Structural Change (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.carbontracker.org/report/the-us-coal-crash/. 
 49 Energy-related CO2 Emissions From Natural Gas Surpass Coal as Fuel Use Patterns Change, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
27552.  
 50 Natural Gas Prices in 2016 Were the Lowest in Nearly 20 Years, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29552 (“Natural gas spot 
prices in 2016 averaged $2.49 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) at the national benchmark Henry 
Hub, the lowest annual average price since 1999.”). 
 51 See Growth In U.S. Hydrocarbon Production From Shale Resources Driven By Drilling Efficiency, 
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail. 
php?id=15351. 
 52 Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Fossil Fuels Still Dominate U.S. Energy Consumption Despite Recent Market Share Decline, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
26912 (“Liquid biofuels have also increased in recent years, contributing to the growing renewable share of 
total energy consumption.”). 
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solar.55 Due to a combination of reasons, the value of coal has declined by the 
“highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the past 50 years.”56  
This decline in coal production poses a substantial threat to coal companies 
and coal mining towns.57 As unemployment rates for coal industry employees 
are continuing to rise, more and more regions of the country are beginning to 
resemble Lindytown, West Virginia.58 The crisis became such a national 
concern that President Donald Trump ran on a platform promising thousands 
of new jobs to disparaged coal towns.59 Since in office, President Trump has 
rolled back President Barack Obama’s moratorium on coal leases on federal 
lands and vetoed regulations promulgated by the Office of Surface Mining.60 
While these efforts appeal to disparaged coal towns, President Trump cannot 
“save” coal for multiple reasons.  
First, coal is not failing because there are not enough places to mine; coal 
is struggling because the free market is forcing coal out.61 Driving up the 
demand for coal would require direct government intervention mandating 
consumption—an unlikely option. Second, President Trump’s policies relating 
to natural gas actually allow other forms of energy to outcompete coal.62 
President Trump supports increased access to natural gas, which will only 
stabilize prices and continue to drive down demand for coal.63 The best 
President Trump can do is to perhaps extend the life of the dying industry, but 
the evidence suggests coal will never return to what it once was.64 
 
 55 See Renewable Generation Capacity Expected To Account For Most 2016 Capacity Additions, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
29492. 
 56 Fossil Fuels Still Dominate, supra note 54 (“The most significant decline in recent years has been 
coal: U.S. coal consumption fell 13% in 2015, the highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the 
past 50 years. The only similar declines were in 2009 and 2012, when coal fell 12% below the level in the 
previous year.”).  
 57 Assault On Coal Brings High Unemployment To Eastern Kentucky, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY 
RESEARCH (Dec. 5, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/federal-governments-assault-on-coal-
brings-high-unemployment-to-eastern-kentucky/ (stating unemployment rates increasing up to the highest rate 
in Wyoming of twenty percent for surface coal mining between 2010 and 2011).  
 58 Id. (unemployment rates increasing up to the highest rate in Wyoming of twenty percent for surface 
coal mining between 2010 and 2011). 
 59 An America First Energy Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-
energy (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
 60 See Eric Lipton and Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, NEW 
YORK TIMES, (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-
new-life-on-us-lands.html; Stream Protection Rule, Pub. L. No. 115-5, 131 Stat. 10 (2017). 
 61 Renewable Generation Capacity, supra note 55. 
 62 An America First Energy Plan, supra note 59. 
 63 Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50. 
 64 See Renewable Generation Capacity, supra note 55; Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50. 
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As demand for coal declines, there is a higher risk of financial problems, 
and the question of coal companies filing for bankruptcy becomes a matter of 
when, not if. Current legislation regulating coal operations includes safeguards 
for the environment in times of financial hardship. It is recognized that “a 
bedrock principle of environmental law and regulation is that pollution costs 
should be borne by their creators.”65 Thus, requiring a company to bond for 
their environmental reclamation shifts the risk of default from the public to the 
private sector.66 But the system fails when those bonding safeguards allow 
companies to skirt their responsibilities.  
The SMCRA sets certain minimum requirements to ensure coal companies 
restore mined land.67 Under SMCRA, a person must post an adequate 
reclamation bond before receiving a permit to conduct surface coal mining 
operations.68 The reclamation bonds required by SMCRA must be “sufficient 
to assure the completion of the reclamation plan if the work had to be 
performed by the regulatory authority in the event of forfeiture.”69 A permittee 
must provide and maintain an adequate reclamation bond from the initial day 
of mining operation throughout the life of the authorized mining operation.70  
In certain limited circumstances, regulators may allow a permittee to meet 
the reclamation bonding requirements by providing a “self-bond.”71 Self-bonds 
were created to allow coal companies to avoid setting aside reclamation funds 
when they are liquid enough to pay for entire reclamation projects.72 A state 
with a permitting agency may or may not allow self-bonding.73 Any state 
program authorizing the use of self-bonding must “assure that the regulatory 
authority will have available sufficient money to complete the reclamation plan 
for any areas which may be in default at any time” and “must provide a 
substantial economic incentive for the permittee to comply with all reclamation 
provisions.”74 In order to qualify, the filing company must have a ratio of total 
 
 65 James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: An Analysis of Environmental 
Bonding and Assurance Rules (Aug. 2001), http://www.ucl.ac.uk.cserge/Boyd.pdf.  
 66 David Gerard, The Law and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 26 RESOURCES POLICY 189, 190 
(2000).  
 67 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 68 30 C.F.R. § 800.11 (2012). 
 69 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (2012). 
 70 62 Ill. Adm. Code 1800.13 (2012). 
 71 30 C.F.R. § 800.23 (2012). 
 72 See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c) (2012). 
 73 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) (2012). 
 74 Id.; see Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations 
Under Regulatory Programs; Self-Bonding, 48 Fed. Reg. 36418-01 (Sept. 9, 1983). The summary stated:  
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liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities of 1.2 times or greater.75  
If, after a permit is issued, it becomes clear that a company’s financial 
situation no longer meets the established standards, the permittee must either 
replace the bond within a limited period of time or must “cease coal extraction 
and . . . immediately begin to conduct reclamation operations in accordance 
with the reclamation plan.”76 But companies that are not financially healthy 
enough to self-bond can use a loophole: self-bond through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries that look healthy on paper, but in reality are no more solvent than 
their parent companies.77 The language of the self-bonding rules allows for 
financial requirements to be met by “the applicant or its parent corporation 
guarantor.”78  
In 1988, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement 
amended C.F.R. § 800, allowing third parties to guarantee a self-bond.79 Courts 
 
The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) is promulgating new rules 
on self-bonding pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. States are 
not required to adopt self-bonding rules. This rule establishes the minimum standards of financial 
eligibility to self-bond for States that wish to allow self-bonding. The applicant for a self-bond is 
required to demonstrate at least 5 years of continuous operation and: financial solvency 
demonstrated by an “A” or higher bond rating; or, a tangible net worth of at least $10 million, 
plus certain financial ratios; or, ownership of at least $20 million of tangible fixed assets, plus 
certain financial ratios. The amount of all self-bonds that regulatory authorities may accept would 
be limited to 25 percent of the applicant’s tangible net worth. Several other criteria for self-
bonding also are established. A regulatory authority may accept the guarantee of a qualifying 
parent corporation for its subsidiaries. These rules replace the previous rules which were 
suspended. 
 75 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b)(3) (2012).  
 76 Id. § 800.16(e). 
 77 See id. § 800.23(c)(1).  
 78 Id. 
 79 Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations; Permanent Regulatory Program; Performance 
Bonds; Bond Release Application, 53 Fed. Reg. 994-01 (Jan. 14, 1988). The summary stated:  
The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) of the U.S. Department 
of the Interior (DOI) is amending the rules that govern the information required in an 
application to release a performance bond to include the name of the permittee and amending 
the bonding rules to allow third parties to guarantee a self-bond. These revisions are in 
accordance with the Secretary’s brief of March 5, 1984, in which the Secretary addressed the 
National Wildlife Federation’s challenge to the omission of the permittee’s name in the 
published notice of bond release and in response to a June 16, 1986, petition for rulemaking 
from the National Coal Association/American Mining Congress (NCA/AMC) Joint Committee 
on Surface Mining Regulations requesting that OSMRE amend its rules to allow third parties to 
guarantee a self-bond. The rules were proposed on November 26, 1986, with a comment period 
that closed on February 5, 1987. Six parties commented on this proposal. These final rules are 
adopted for the permanent regulatory program. 
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have recently read this provision as permitting a struggling parent to lean on its 
affiliate companies.80 Two of the country’s largest coal companies, Arch Coal 
and Alpha Natural Resources, are among those that used the financials of their 
subsidiaries to qualify for self-bonding.81 The practice of essentially using 
another company’s financials to qualify for self-bonding violates the trust that 
permitting agencies give to coal companies.82 While using an affiliate to 
maintain self-bonding qualifications may have worked in an era when the coal 
market was more resilient, the current volatile market has sent some of the 
country’s largest coal companies into bankruptcy. Exacerbating the problem, 
“energy companies who self-bond lack a diversified business and participate in 
a rapidly changing commodity market; they are therefore at a higher risk of 
default.”83 
Although this issue has been brought to the attention of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, the agency charged with managing self-bonds, its 
current guidelines are merely suggestions.84 Meanwhile, three of the country’s 
largest coal companies have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and there are 
likely more self-bonded coal companies following in their footsteps. 
Examining patterns of past coal bankruptcies will demonstrate the problem of 
self-bonding in an unstable industry and highlight the areas in which the 
institution of bankruptcy can improve.  
C. Case Studies: Recent Coal Bankruptcies 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is appealing to coal companies because it allows 
them to stay in business while they sell off assets and reorganize.85 But 
shutting down entire mining operations and communities could have major 
negative ramifications. A coal company may also seek additional benefits from 
a chapter 11 reorganization, including the sale of assets “free and clear of 
 
 80 See 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(c)(1) (2012). 
 81 Letter from Maria Cantwell & Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senators, to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, 
Comptroller Gen. of U.S. (Mar. 8, 2016). 
 82 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(g) (2012). 
 83 Dion W. Hayes & Sarah Link Schultz, Light Out! Hot Topics and Recent Developments in Energy-
Related Chapter 11 Cases, Am. Bankr. Inst. 259 (June 2016). 
 84 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement to 
Initiate Rulemaking on Self-Bonding for Coal Mines (Aug. 16, 2016) (Proposing goals for a new rulemaking 
process that would modify self-bonding eligibility standards, provide for third-party review, collateralize a 
certain percentage of self-bonds, make replacement bonds more attainable, and minimize risks associated with 
corporate sureties that rely on cash flow basis to cover reclamation costs when bonds are forfeited; however, 
the notice and comment rulemaking process may take a while and may not even be binding on all states).  
 85 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 875–876 (Jan. 2014). 
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encumbrances” which then turn to proceeds.86 Therefore, by going through a 
chapter 11 proceeding, a coal company can avoid posting reclamation bonds, 
continue to operate its business, and make money from any assets sold. These 
incentives to file for bankruptcy, rather than posting collateral reclamation 
bonds, are in conflict with the fundamental purpose of reorganization, which 
“is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of 
jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”87 It is a “misuse of economic 
resources” in multiple senses for a company to avoid posting the legally 
required reclamation bond by first self-bonding through a subsidiary and then 
file for bankruptcy.”88 The following are examples of major coal companies 
that have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in similar fashions. 
1. Arch Coal 
Arch Coal self-bonded through a subsidiary, Arch Western Resources, and 
owed $458 million in self-bonded claims.89 Arch Coal was allowed to continue 
operations while in bankruptcy, with a majority of its reclamation liabilities 
un-bonded.90 While the reemerged Arch Coal was required to post substitute 
bonds, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality stated in a letter in 
March of 2016 that its subsidiary, Arch Western Resources, still qualified for 
self-bonding.91 This means that there are no restrictions on using the subsidiary 
to self-bond in the future. The letter from the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality suggests that they will continue to allow Arch’s 
subsidiaries to benefit from self-bonding, and potentially allow Arch to self-
bond through them or on their own in the future.92  
Although Wyoming requires companies to provide reclamation bonds, they 
also have an incentive to allow the practice of self-bonding to continue because 
self-bonding means more money in a company’s pocket.93 Consequently, states 
that allow self-bonding have an automatic advantage of attracting coal 
companies (and their tax money) over states that do not offer self-bonding. 
Even after a state permits a self-bond, it is incentivized to help the company 
 
 86 Id.  
 87 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Arch Coal Asks U.S. Bankruptcy Court to Ease its Cleanup Costs, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2016), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-arch-coal-cleanup-idUSKCN0UP2GT20160111. 
 90 Restructuring Information, ARCH COAL, http://www.archcoal.com/restructuring/ (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017).  
 91 Letter, supra note 81.  
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. 
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flourish—coal mining continues to fund communities across the country, and 
halting operations due to a violation of a reclamation bond could bring 
hardship to thousands of Americans.94  
Minor cyclical downturns in the coal market are a trend of the past, and 
allowing a coal company to go bankrupt without sufficient reclamation bonds 
could mean that the government, and in turn taxpayers, are responsible for the 
cleanup costs.95 Despite the incentives that both the state and the coal company 
have to continue to self-bond, Wyoming should not have left open the 
possibility for a prior bankruptcy debtor. Unfortunately, this trend continued 
with the bankruptcy of Alpha Natural Resources.96  
2. Alpha Natural Resources 
Alpha Natural Resources, with a total of $676 million in self-bonds 
throughout the country, of which $411 million is for bonds in Wyoming alone, 
filed for bankruptcy in multiple states in 2015.97 The company self-bonded 
with a subsidiary’s financials, claiming the subsidiary could cover the cost of 
the bonds.98 Yet, the subsidiary did not have enough assets to cover $676 
million in bonds, leaving Alpha in violation of their mining permit.99 The court 
was faced with two options: suspend mining licenses for violating bond 
requirements or look past the illegality of Alpha’s actions and allow operations 
to continue. Suspending a mining license would effectively stop all function of 
Alpha’s mines, causing income streams to stop and leave many citizens 
unemployed. Repealing a license would also push Alpha further into financial 
distress, causing it to be even less likely to pay to reclaim mined property. At 
the risk of exacerbating the issue, Wyoming allowed Alpha to continue to 
operate in exchange for a small percentage of their bond responsibility during 
the bankruptcy process.100  
Alpha’s problems, however, continued. Alpha purchased Massey Energy, 
the coal company that bought Lindytown, and later filed for bankruptcy in 
 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. 848 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016). 
 98 See Casper Star Tribune, Uncharted Territory: What do Alpha Natural Resources Self-Bonding Woes 
Mean? (June 4, 2015), http://trib.com/business/energy/uncharted-territory-what-do-alpha-natural-resources-
self-bonding-woes/article_407af6fe-0244-530c-a8fc-cd53cc0a5e83.html.  
 99 In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. 848. 
 100 See Letter, supra note 81. 
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West Virginia.101 The court acknowledged that if the state did not approve the 
coal company’s reorganization plan, Alpha “would be required to immediately 
post over $244 million in substitute bonds in order to continue mining in West 
Virginia.”102 The court approved the settlement with West Virginia because 
“given the Debtors’ limited liquidity, this could be a substantial hurdle that 
could impair the Debtors’ reorganization efforts.”103 Although in this instance, 
Alpha was allowed to “gradually transition away from the self-bonding 
problem” after successfully reorganizing, there was no agreement that Alpha 
would be unable to self-bond in the future.104  
In the end, Alpha was able to avoid paying full price for reclamation bonds 
by first using subsidiaries that could not foot the bill to self-bond, then turning 
to bankruptcy to escape paying collateral bonds, and finally restructuring 
through bankruptcy without becoming precluded from repeating the same 
pattern. So how does a company become so financially unstable that a 
bankruptcy court confirms a plan in order to avoid liability that could be 
incurred by the state? 
An impending bankruptcy should be foreseeable to a devaluing coal 
company, triggering the requirement to notify their permitting agency when it 
falls out of self-bond eligibility and post another approved bond method within 
ninety days.105 In the case of Alpha’s bankruptcy, the company had notified the 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality that it was no longer eligible 
for its outstanding self-bonds, yet it filed for bankruptcy before the end of the 
ninety day requirement to post other bonds.106 Alpha likely filed for 
bankruptcy at the last minute, right before having to pay millions in a required 
bond, because it was experiencing a “melting ice cube”107 effect. Essentially, a 
company is considered a “melting ice cube” if its assets are rapidly declining in 
value.108 Companies that are showing “ice cube” characteristics frequently rely 
on bankruptcy for a quick sale of their property.109 Alpha turned to bankruptcy 
for relief because it experienced a decline in assets, so much so that neither 
self-bonding nor collateral bonding requirements could be met. 
 
 101 In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. at 857. 
 102 Id.  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(g) (2012). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Jacoby, supra note 85, at 875–76. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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Under SMCRA, a coal company is in violation of its permit if it does not 
have a reclamation bond of any sort, which can result in consequences such as 
a suspended permit.110 Yet during the bankruptcy, Wyoming stayed 
enforcement action on the unmet reclamation bond requirements and allowed 
the companies to pledge a “supermajority claim” to the state based on the 
chance that the company did not exit chapter 11.111 The claim, approved by the 
bankruptcy court, was for $61 million, and nowhere near the necessary $411 
million pledged for reclamation costs.112 Alpha was fortunate enough to regain 
financial strength and replace all its prior self-bonds. The final restructuring 
and approved plan designated for Alpha required them to transfer all $411 
million to secured bonds, but did not specify that Alpha could not avail 
themselves to self-bonding further down the road.113 Moreover, the actions 
taken by Wyoming do not stop other states from issuing self-bonds and 
exacerbating the problem of $3.86 billion in outstanding self-bonded 
obligations. 
3. Peabody Coal  
Most recently, Peabody Coal, another one of the United States’ major coal 
companies, and the world’s largest publicly owned coal producer, filed for 
bankruptcy in April 2016.114 Although federal requirements demand that a self-
bonding applicant “has a ratio of liabilities to net worth of 2.5 or less and a 
ratio of current assets to liabilities of 1.2 or greater,” Peabody had a ratio of 
liabilities to net worth of 11.6 and a ratio of current assets to liabilities of 
0.84.115 Peabody filed with debt of $10.1 billion total, and $1.1 billion in self-
bonding across four states, with $727 million in liabilities located within 
Wyoming alone.116 Unlike the two previous major coal bankruptcies, Peabody 
did not file a plan for reorganization contemporaneously with its bankruptcy 
filing.117 Therefore, it is still unknown if they will propose self-bonding or if 
Wyoming would object.118  
 
 110 30 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2012).  
 111 See Letter, supra note 81. 
 112 In re Alpha Nat. Res. Inc., 544 B.R. at 853. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Tracy Rucinski & Tom Hals, Leading Global Coal Miner Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-peabody-energy-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0XA0E7.  
 115 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(3)(11) (2012); see Rucinski, supra note 114. 
 116 Rucinski, supra note 114.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id. 
HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 12/12/2017 11:32 AM 
2017] SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 221 
Peabody is also facing issues in Illinois. Peabody’s Illinois Basin self-
bonding is done through a wholly-owned subsidiary of Peabody Energy, 
Peabody Investments Corporation.119 Peabody has nationwide issues with self-
bonding, and worldwide financial problems; as such, an issue arises if Peabody 
takes a substantial hit in bankruptcy. In order to protect American jobs and 
allow Peabody to have its “fresh start,” bankruptcy courts may be tempted to 
approve a plan that allows Peabody to continue to self-bond or return to it 
shortly after.  
The goal of bankruptcy to provide a debtor with a “fresh start”120 is at odds 
with the public policy driving reclamation bonds.121 Not all companies filing 
for bankruptcy deserve a fresh start, especially if they are attempting to avoid 
their reclamation liabilities. In the cases of Alpha and Arch, who both posted 
self-bonds through the financials of affiliate companies, filing for bankruptcy 
forced the court to choose between allowing reorganization or shutting down 
operations and ensuring non-compliance with reclamation liabilities. But a 
major problem arises when a company cannot survive reorganization, or when 
emerging companies from reorganizations, such as Alpha’s phoenix company 
Contura Energy, begin the same pattern of self-bonding in five years.122 Or, in 
the case of Patriot Coal, file for bankruptcy twice.123 In such situations, 
bankruptcy would effectively have had no deterring force at all in stopping the 
coal company from engaging in irresponsible self-bonding practices.  
D. Litigation Tactic Cases 
The stories of Alpha and Arch Coal are illustrative of what is known as the 
“litigation tactic case.”124 Cases that fall under this category typically occur 
when pressures mount from an external dispute that incentivizes a bankruptcy 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (the court noted the purpose of bankruptcy was to 
give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).  
 121 OSMRE created reclamation bonds to clean up the environmental damage done to land and water 
systems by mining operations. The goal of reclamation is to return the land to pre-mining quality and avail it to 
the same uses. Reclamation Performance Bonds, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/bondsoverview.shtm (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
 122 New coal companies, including newly formed reorganized companies, cannot qualify for self-
bonding until they have operated for five years.  
 123 Matt Jarzemsky & Peg Brickley, Patriot Coal Again Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, NEW YORK 
TIMES (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patriot-coal-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcyagain-14314 
35830.  
 124 F. Stephen Knippenberg & Lawrence Ponoroff, Legal Theory: The Implied Good Faith Filing 
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 919, 938 (1991). 
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filing.125 These disputes can include “evident intention to circumvent state law 
requirements regarding the posting of a . . . bond as a condition to appealing an 
adverse judgment.”126 The bankruptcy court has discretion to consider intent 
when allowing a bankruptcy case to proceed.127 The court should use this 
discretion to take the current energy market, and purpose for filing for 
bankruptcy into consideration.  
Current projections for the energy market predict coal consumption 
inevitably declining with no rebound in sight.128 Unfortunately, as the coal 
market continues to fall, more companies are likely on the same path to 
bankruptcy. The chances of a coal company recovering, even if being allowed 
to restructure, are slimming. While a coal company loses its grasp on the 
market, it may not be focused on cleaning up after itself. Such a shift in focus 
negatively affects places like Lindytown. The problem is compounding 
because the law is letting it. Yet the shelter that coal companies seek in 
bankruptcy during times of financial distress can change the course of harm 
left in the wake of the dying coal industry.  
II. ANALYSIS 
The institution of bankruptcy has two main instruments that operate to 
carry out its intended purposes of proving debtors with a fresh start and fair 
treatment to creditors.129 Both of these tools, the Code and the bankruptcy 
court, can be used to illicit change. Bankruptcy courts are more commonly 
dealing with business issues “related only incidentally, if at all, to the problems 
of default and immediate financial ruin.”130 The expansion of the bankruptcy 
court’s scope, for better or for worse, has caused an increase of debtors turning 
to the court to avoid or decrease their bond requirements.131 As a result, coal 
companies are increasingly looking for relief in the bankruptcy system.  
Bankruptcy as an institution has gradually become a forum to which parties 
have turned to resolve basic business and economic problems that are not 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012). 
 128 Fossil Fuels Still Dominate, supra note 54 (“U.S. coal has seen as significant decline: consumption 
fell 13% in 2015, the highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the past 50 years”). 
 129 Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (1934).  
 130 Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 966. 
 131 Id. at 938 (“Commercial debtors have shown an increased willingness to use the bankruptcy law both 
as a tactic in business litigation and as an instrument of business planning.”).  
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satisfactorily addressed elsewhere.132 Coal companies are misusing bankruptcy 
courts as a forum for escaping traditional requirements of reclamation 
bonding.133 In turn, the courts have to bear the costs of a company abusing the 
aims of bankruptcy.134 While abuse of bankruptcy is not recommended, the 
capacity to institute change on a federal level suggests that the bankruptcy 
system is perhaps the best place to address the issue of inappropriate self-
bonding in the coal industry.135 There are three main areas in which bankruptcy 
can become a tool to combat the increasing probability of un-reclaimed coal 
mines: the existing Code, a proposed carve-out to the Code, and the role of 
bankruptcy judges to steer the use of bankruptcy in the right direction.  
A. Evaluating Tools Within the Existing Code to Discourage Inadequate Self-
Bonding 
The Code provides two main provisions that can act as a backstop against 
debtors filing for relief to avoid fulfilling required bond amounts covering 
reclamation costs of mining property: the good faith and feasibility 
requirements.  
1. Good Faith  
First, the Code provides a “good faith” provision to discourage inadequate 
self-bonding. If a coal company were to have filed for bankruptcy for the sole 
purpose of using the procedural incidents of bankruptcy to secure a tactical 
advantage, the good faith requirement may provide an existing stop within the 
Code.136 Section 1129(a)(3) requires that: “[t]he plan has been proposed in 
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”137 Some courts focus on 
the debtor’s pre-petition conduct, similar to the good faith requirement under 
§ 362(d)(1) and § 1112(b).138 The Code does not define “good faith,” for 
purposes of determining good faith under § 1129(a)(3), and the most common 
point of inquiry by the court is the plan itself and whether such a plan will 
 
 132 Id. at 966. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 92 (Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015) (preferring federal environmental policy over state policy, one reason 
being that federal regulation promotes a uniform approach).  
 136 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012). 
 137 Id. 
 138 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND 
BUSINESSES 372 (6th ed. 2006).  
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fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the 
Code.139  
The good faith requirement provides an additional check on a debtor’s 
intentional impairment of claims. Good faith is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis,140 but it serves as a condition to securing chapter 11 relief. Failure to 
satisfy the good faith requirement constitutes “cause,” sufficient for dismissal 
under § 1112(b).141 Specifically, a proposed plan: “must be ‘viewed in light of 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding confection’ of the plan [and] . . . 
 the bankruptcy judge is in the best position to assess the good faith of the 
parties’ proposals.”142 The totality of the circumstances that may be considered 
includes a myriad of factors depending on the circuit. Subjective intent is not 
wholly determinative.143 The most common test requires “a demonstration of 
both the inability to formulate an effective reorganization plan and improper 
motivation in filing”144 in order to serve the “various and conflicting interests 
of debtors, creditors and the courts.”145  
Bankruptcy courts have a great deal of discretion regarding rulings on a 
“good faith” challenge.146 One court even expressed the discretion as a 
mechanism to “allow courts to utilize their gut feeling about a plans effects.”147 
A judge should take all situational factors into consideration and “the reading 
of the law should be tempered by the judge’s sense of equity—what is just in 
the circumstances of the case. If there are objective facts to support this 
feeling, perhaps the plan should not be confirmed.”148 Moreover, by using 
“common sense” logic, even though a coal company has a plan that it can 
afford, if it self-bonded through a subsidiary it may not automatically pass the 
good faith test. Arguably in some instances, it should not. 
A company could easily have prior bad actions and still propose a plan that 
will achieve the goals of bankruptcy with fairness. However, in a situation 
similar to that of Arch Coal, who filed for bankruptcy at the end of their 
ninety-day period to post a bond, lack of good faith may be relevant. In 
 
 139 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012). 
 140 Jorgensen v. Federal Land Bank (In re Jorgensen), 66 B.R. 104, 108–09 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986). 
 141 In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 426 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 142 Id. at 424–25 (quoting In re Jasik, 727 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1984)).  
 143 Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 144 Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 926. 
 145 Id. (quoting Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1989)).  
 146 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012). 
 147 In re John P. Timko et al., No. 87-09318 (unpublished) (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 1988).  
 148 Id. 
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Marsch v. Marsch, the debtor filed for chapter 11 in order to avoid posting an 
appeal bond in regard to a legal judgment.149 The court found that using 
bankruptcy to delay or avoid judgments, or as a litigation strategy, is an act in 
bad faith.150 The court dismissed the case, reasoning that the filing had 
objectives outside the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.151 Although 
there may be an exception for when a bond could disrupt a debtor’s business, 
in the case of a coal company a bond that is required for business is not likely 
one that would “disrupt” it.152 Applying the policy behind the holding in 
Marsch, a coal company that chooses to file for bankruptcy, when it has the 
ability to post alternative bonds, within ninety days of losing self-bonding 
eligibility would arguably be acting in bad faith.  
Unfortunately, there are varying opinions regarding the meaning of “good 
faith.” The discrepancy between the views on the underlying purposes of 
bankruptcy can alter the outcome of bankruptcy filings, and in particular the 
satisfaction of a successful plan.153 On one hand, if the primary goal, and the 
only factor in a good faith analysis, were that a debtor could successfully 
complete their reorganization plan, “the implicit good faith filing requirement 
will never stand in the way of Chapter 11 filings by large, resource-rich 
business enterprises.”154 This definition of good faith would seemingly always 
favor a debtor coal company as they are traditionally known as “resource-
rich.” Yet with the current changes to the energy sector, a court should more 
critically examine the company’s ability to reorganize. On the other hand, if 
the purpose of bankruptcy is to protect the integrity of the process, then each 
case will be determined based on whether its continuance would compromise 
the purposes of bankruptcy. The court’s inquiry may be influenced, but not 
controlled, by the size of the debtor.155 This understanding is more in line with 
Marsch, as it looks to whether the case was filed in line with the purposes and 
goals of bankruptcy.  
Outside of the two purposes for the good faith requirement, there are two 
general opinions of bankruptcy goals: Traditional or Collectivist.156 The 
 
 149 In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 825. 
 150 Id. at 828 (finding that a debtor using bankruptcy to avoid judgment of the law when they could 
likely afford the judgment is not entitled to the protection of bankruptcy).  
 151 Id.; see also Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 946–47. 
 152 In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828–29; see also In re Sparklet Devices, Inc., 154 B.R. 544, 548–49 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 1993).  
 153 Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 947. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
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Traditional view holds that debt collection is always relevant, but it can be 
sacrificed when necessary to achieve other goals of bankruptcy.157 Conversely, 
for Collectivists, bankruptcy is merely a means of federal debt collection.158 
The paradigm that arises with coal companies filing for bankruptcy with self-
bonds is that neither goal of bankruptcy would be met, as it is possible for both 
bad faith and insufficient debt collection to be involved. Therefore, a coal 
company with a reorganization plan that approves or allows room for an 
inadequate reclamation self-bond, especially by a subsidiary, would be in 
violation of “good faith” and violation of the public policy interest in 
reclaiming mined lands.  
2. The Feasibility Requirement 
Second, the Code provides a “feasibility requirement” that discourages 
inadequate self-bonding. Section 1129(a)(11) could provide additional support 
that a proposed or potential future self-bond could not be included in a 
sufficient reorganization plan. Section 1129(a)(11) establishes the financial 
feasibility requirement: “Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed 
by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor 
or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or 
reorganization is proposed in the plan.”159 In determining whether a plan meets 
the requirements of § 1129(a)(11), the bankruptcy court must take a close look 
at the plan to ensure that there is a reasonable chance of success.160 Several 
courts have considered the following factors when determining if a plan is 
feasible: 
(1) the adequacy of the debtor’s capital structure; (2) the earning 
power of its business; (3) economic conditions; (4) the ability of the 
debtor’s management; (5) the probability of the continuation of the 
same management; and (6) any other related matters which determine 
the prospects of a sufficiently successful operation to enable 
performance of the provisions of the plan161 
The feasibility test and the good faith requirement are not mutually 
exclusive, yet they are loosely linked. For example, if the court is within a 
jurisdiction that takes pre-bankruptcy behavior into consideration for 
evaluating the good faith requirement, a coal company using bankruptcy to 
 
 157 Id. at 959. 
 158 Id. at 949–50. 
 159 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012).  
 160 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 161 Id. 
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avoid posting full collateral bonds will likely fail the feasibility requirement of 
plan confirmation.162 In this situation, the feasibility requirement serves as a 
second check on the integrity of the debtor. Unfortunately, that will not always 
be the case.  
If a coal company filed for bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that looks at the 
probability of plan success as a factor in the good faith analysis, then the plan 
would automatically pass the feasibility test as well. In other words, if a plan is 
feasible, and treats all creditors fairly, it follows that it would also be made in 
good faith to carry out the purposes of bankruptcy. Under the current Code, 
being able to successfully complete a reorganization plan, despite using the 
proceedings to avoid full collateral bonds, does not forbid a coal company 
from self-bonding in the future.  
In the case of coal companies, the unique nature of a debtor satisfying 
legally required bonds through a subsidiary may provide a new problem for the 
bankruptcy court. Plan confirmation does not typically require the court to look 
at how other companies could affect the feasibility of the plan.163 Yet, the 
relationship between parent and subsidiary company in the context of self-
bonding may create an exception in which a third-party company could affect 
the feasibility of a debtor’s reorganization plan. Normally, if a plan meets 
§ 1129 (a)(11), that does not mean the court looked to the financial strength of 
the debtor company’s subsidiaries.164 This is a potentially huge oversight, 
especially if the company has the ability to use subsidiaries to self-bond in the 
future. A bankruptcy court faced with this situation should use their 
discretionary powers to consider both the parent company’s financial strength 
as well as that of its subsidiaries. The broad discretionary powers given to the 
bankruptcy courts allow judges to make decisions based on fairness. 
Overall, the Code as it stands may not be the ideal tool to combat 
insufficient reclamation bonds. But the flexibility that the Code offers may 
allow a court to consider and weigh multiple factors to deal with the case 
equitably. Some of these factors, like the good faith and feasibility 
requirements, are not new to bankruptcy courts. Other factors also arise out of 
the unique circumstance of a “litigation tactic case” by coal companies. For 
example, courts may have to inquire into the financial stability of subsidiary 
companies to accurately predict the success of a plan under both the good faith 
 
 162 See generally id. 
 163 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(11) (2012). 
 164 Id. 
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and feasibility requirements. Most of these factors will guide the court to 
dismiss a case for bad faith or lack of plan feasibility.  
However, there are factors pushing in the direction of allowing such a case 
to proceed. In some situations, the driving force behind giving debtors a fresh 
start may override any suspicious acts a company has engaged in in the past or 
any dishonest intentions it had for filing for bankruptcy. Even if the Code were 
equipped to punish companies for skimping on self-bonds, the bankruptcy 
court would still face policy issues. Dismissal of a case could lead to permit 
violations, worsening a company’s financial situation along with the hope of 
full mining reclamation. These implications exacerbate the problems faced by 
coal companies and why many seek shelter in bankruptcy. So why not try to 
stop coal companies from self-bonding in the first place? 
B. Potential Changes: Create a Carved Out Exception Within the Bankruptcy 
Code 
Currently, under the SMCRA, a company can requalify for self-bonding 
five years after they come out of bankruptcy and can financially qualify.165 
This scheme opens the possibility of creating even more problems in the future 
as the coal market continues to act unpredictably. This Comment proposes a 
carved-out exception to the current Code explicitly disallowing a coal 
company, including any company that arises from the reorganization, from 
either proposing self-bonding in its reorganization plan or later entering 
bankruptcy with self-bonds. The proposed carve-out states:166 
No coal company seeking relief under or arising from this Title shall:  
(a) include self-bonding within its reorganization plan, nor 
(b) qualify for self-bonding in the future under any provision of 
30 C.F.R. § 800.23.  
The proposed carve-out would have several characteristics. First, the carve-
out would be applicable no matter how many years a company had been out of 
bankruptcy and would provide multiple benefits. It would promote the purpose 
of self-bonding, allowing financially stable companies to have the option to 
use that to their advantage, and retain more of their liquid assets. Second, the 
carve-out would not ban self-bonding entirely. Self-bonding would still be 
available for smaller coal companies with a smaller fraction of their 
reclamation bonds in self-bonding or for companies that are diverse with assets 
 
 165 30 C.F.R. §§ 800.23 (b)(2)–(3) (2012).  
 166 This use of “carve-out” differs from the phrase’s other use in setting aside funds in a financing order 
for a debtor in possession. 
HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 12/12/2017 11:32 AM 
2017] SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 229 
outside of the coal market. Lastly, the carve-out allows for easy enforcement 
for both the permitting agency and the bankruptcy court by avoiding judgment 
calls required under the current state of § 1129(a).  
Having a clear rule stating no coal company that filed for bankruptcy or 
received a discharge can apply for self-bonding would cut down on both the 
initial research costs as well as costs associated with monitoring compliance 
throughout the life of the bond.167 By knowing what to expect throughout the 
bonding process, the rule would also incentivize current self-bond holders to 
manage their bonds properly. In many ways, this carve-out will provide a 
check on the purposes of bankruptcy. Instead of providing a safe-haven and a 
“fresh start” for companies that are trying to avoid bond requirements, 
companies will only turn to bankruptcy when they need it the most. The 
benefits to self-bonding are great enough to induce companies to choose to 
reduce the percentage of its self-bonds rather than file for bankruptcy. The risk 
of losing self-bonding altogether by filing for bankruptcy will lead to a 
reduction in bankruptcy filings.  
A carve-out would also have certain costs. If the Code explicitly 
disallowed a type of permit from being issued, through an exception, it could 
conflict with § 525. Section 525(a) stipulates:  
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to 
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, 
condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant 
against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or 
discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or 
has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act.168 
An outright denial of a bond, by a permitting agency, to a previous bankruptcy 
debtor would fall under the definition of “refuse to renew a . . . permit.”169 This 
requirement is consistent with one of the aims of bankruptcy that provides a 
fresh start in which the reorganized entity is treated as a new company in the 
eyes of the law. 170 The section is intended to allow a struggling company to 
 
 167 Gerard, supra note 66, at 190. 
 168 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012). 
 169 Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Angelucci, 145 B.R. 895, 900 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (alluding in dicta 
that if the Workers’ Compensation Board revoked the Certificate of Self Insurance for the sole purpose of 
debtors’ affiliation with bankruptcy it would be discrimination in violation of § 525(a)).  
 170 In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 274 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (“A bankruptcy statute . . . is to be 
interpreted with basic bankruptcy policies in mind, including the policy of promoting a “fresh start” for the 
debtor.”).  
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recover without additional hardship via discrimination.171 A “fresh start,” 
however, may not be in line with the public policy behind requiring a company 
to take responsibility for their environmental liabilities.172  
Under § 525, there are serious implications to allowing a coal company 
to turn to bankruptcy at the first sign of financial trouble without placing 
any long-term punishment on it for shifting the environmental risk to the 
public. Places such as Lindytown cannot afford to bear the costs of 
cleaning up if the coal company were to file for bankruptcy and leave 
reclamation bonds unfulfilled. Bankruptcy proceedings will not reduce the 
damage to coal towns across the nation. The weight of the public policy 
toward a clean and healthy environment suggest that the benefits of the 
carve-out should outweigh the strictness of § 525. There are two potential 
ways to remedy the conflict between the proposed carve-out and § 525: an 
explicit exception or invocation of constitutional avoidance.  
1. Create an Exception Under 11 U.S.C. § 525 
Congress could simultaneously pass an explicit exception under § 525 
along with the carve-out. The exception would acknowledge that although 
barring a debtor from permits would normally be a violation of § 525, doing so 
in the context of a coal company in self-bonding would not produce such a 
violation. Without a violation of § 525, the carve-out would effectively protect 
human health and the environment from the potential consequences of 
bankruptcy.  
The idea of creating a carve-out with an exception in § 525(a) is not new. 
Section 525(a) carves out three federal statutory exceptions to the general ban 
against discrimination by governmental units: the Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act, 1930,173 the Packers and Stockyard Act, 1921,174 and 
section 1 of the Act entitled “An Act for Making Appropriations for the 
Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1944 and for 
Other Purposes.”175 These existing exclusions show that Congress can make 
exceptions favoring public policy under the correct circumstances. An explicit 
 
 171 See generally John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy Laws, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
185 (1986) 
 172 See generally Boyd, supra note 65. 
 173 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s (2012). 
 174 Id. §§ 181–299. 
 175 Id. § 204 (2012). 
HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS 12/12/2017 11:32 AM 
2017] SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 231 
exclusion from the reach of § 525 would bar any argument that the carve-out 
was unlawful discrimination against a debtor.  
2. Approve the Carve-Out Through the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
Assuming the carve-out passed, the court could side-step the conflicting 
policies by using the canon of constitutional avoidance. Invoking the canon 
would allow the court to assume that Congress did not intend to violate § 525 
through the sole act of affirming the carve-out. Essentially, the court is allowed 
to extrapolate that Congress would not pass any legislation that would be 
contradictory.176 Constitutional avoidance would likely be deferred to as it is 
widely accepted to have become a “cardinal principle” of statutory 
interpretation.177 In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council, the court stated that “where an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is 
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”178 In other words, a court will 
assume that Congress did not intend to create a conflict between statutory 
provisions because finding otherwise would mean Congress had violated the 
Constitution.  
Even though a carve-out would likely prove to be effective in bankruptcy 
proceedings, the current political climate is an important factor weighing 
against the timely enactment of a carve-out. The 114th Congress is in a state of 
extreme partisanship and legislative standstill, and matters regarding energy 
are at a particular point of contention.179 
A major energy bill is currently before Congress.180 The North American 
Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 passed the Senate and House 
but is still before Congress resolving issues.181 The bipartisan bill purports to 
boost oil and natural gas production, yet encourage renewable energy sources, 
 
 176 See Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 242 (1964). 
 177 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).  
 178 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988); see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 
(2001) (“[A]ssumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute 
to push the limit of congressional authority.”).  
 179 Chris Mooney, The Senate Just Passed-Overwhelmingly-an Actually Bipartisan Energy Bill, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (April 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/ 
04/20/the-senate-just-passed-overwhelmingly-an-actually-bipartisan-energy-bill/?utm_term=.8db223be66ea. 
 180 North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016, S. 2012, 114th Cong. (2016).  
 181 Id. 
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such as wind and solar power, and increased energy efficiency.182 Although the 
bill has passed both the House and Senate, it was not without hurdles and it has 
still not made it out of Congress. The House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
referred to the bill as “a partisan, special interest package that fails to invest in 
infrastructure, leads to more energy consumption and carbon pollution, stacks 
the deck against the environment and . . . undermines protections for our public 
lands and wildlife.”183  
Meanwhile, House Speaker Paul Ryan, believes the bill “modernizes our 
energy infrastructure so we can address urgent priorities for the country, from 
tackling California’s drought crisis to healing our forests in order to prevent 
wildfires.”184 The difference of opinions regarding the current energy bill 
combined with the political uncertainty arising from the Trump administration 
demonstrates the difficulty that a bankruptcy carve-out regarding coal mining 
would face in being passed. A delayed or stalled enactment of the carve-out 
would do little to the current and ongoing environmental harm, especially 
considering the coal market is in decline. Also standing in the way of a quick 
adoption of a carve-out to the Code are lobbyists. Creating such a blanket 
barrier to self-bonding would not go unnoticed in Washington.  
Adopting a carve-out would likely be the best way that bankruptcy could 
improve insufficient self-bonding to reclaim coal mines. The carve-out within 
the Code would not require judges to use discretion to evaluate whether cases 
are feasible or brought in good faith. It would allow a clear policy to apply to 
all debtor coal companies and would reduce uncertainty. Moreover, the carve-
out would incentivize companies to comply with the self-bonding regulations 
at the outset, likely reducing the bankruptcy court’s docket.  
But the carve-out will face resistance. Unfortunately, because of the current 
Congressional climate, the biggest opposing force against passing the carve-
out is time—the one thing that the citizens of coal regions cannot afford. 
Realistically, solutions outside of the current Code may provide for a faster 
solution to the issue of irresponsible self-bonding through subsidiaries.  
  
 
 182 Congressional Energy Bill at Standstill Over Drilling, THE INTELLIGENCER (June 7, 2016), http:// 
www.theintelligencer.net/news/top-headlines/2016/06/congressional-energy-bill-at-standstill-over-drilling/. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
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C. Solutions Outside of the Bankruptcy Code 
Although the bankruptcy court and judges must work within the confines 
of the Code, they still have the ability to influence change. Judges are often the 
first to identify flaws within the system and encourage reform. Following in 
Justice O’Connor’s footsteps, the bankruptcy court could make a call to the 
federal government to incentivize change.185 With Peabody nearing the end of 
its bankruptcy proceedings and the inevitability of more coal bankruptcies 
becomes apparent, the court has the perfect opportunity to instill a sense of 
urgency to improve. The court can encourage three major changes; a bill 
amending SMCRA; amendments to the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation 
and Enforcement’s permitting regulations; and amending the Code to 
disincentivize misuse of the institution, such as the proposed carve-out in this 
Comment.  
1. Encourage a Bill Amending the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act 
The bankruptcy court could express support for Congress to pass a bill 
amending SMCRA.186 There is currently a bill introduced to the House that 
proposes to amend 30 U.S.C. § 1259 to entirely disallow self-bonds from being 
approved and requiring all outstanding bonds to be replaced by otherwise 
acceptable bonds under SMCRA.187 An amendment to SMCRA would rid 
reclamation costs of uncertainty and eliminate all monitoring costs for the 
permitting agency, which is required when the agency certifying a coal 
company qualifies for self-bonding, whether it be a state or the Office of 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement.188 The outcome of the bill 
depends on the climate of Congress. While there is a split between the House 
and Senate on the energy bill, there may be hope for regulation regarding 
environmental enforcement.189 On June 22, 2016, former President Obama 
signed a bill reforming the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976, the first 
 
 185 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stressing the importance in 
protecting environmental policy interest).  
 186 H.R. 5500, 114th Cong. (2016) (“To protect taxpayers from liability associated with the reclamation 
of surface coal mining operations, and for other purposes.”). 
 187 Id. 
 188 See David Gerard, The Law and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 26 RESOURCES POLICY 189, 191 
(2000), http://faculty.lawrence.edu/gerardd/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/02/22-RP-Gerard-bonding.pdf. 
 189 Congressional Energy Bill, supra note 177.  
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substantial change to an environmental statute in twenty years.190 This 
willingness to pass an amendment to an environmental statute by both political 
parties suggests that Congress may be willing to put aside differences in a 
changing world with increasing environmental risks. However, as with an 
amendment to the Code, the uncertainty of Congress’s timeliness presents a 
problem. Time is of the essence when families and communities are being 
affected now.  
People across the nation are being impacted by the coal industry. 
Environmental justice, the concept that certain people are disproportionally 
affected by environmental harms, is a movement that tries to bring awareness 
to and mitigate the issue. Moreover, the people that are most affected are those 
that are linguistically, racially, or economically isolated.191 Unfortunately, 
situations like Lindytown are common across the country, as citizens who 
cannot afford to go head-to-head with large companies are forced to live in 
unhealthy environments. In that sense, the communities that were able to 
relocate were the fortunate ones.192 Yet, if operating mines are already 
disproportionately affecting families that cannot afford to move or speak out, 
abandoned mines that do not have adequate bonds to reclaim them will only 
exacerbate the environmental justice issue.  
The United States Department of Interior, and in turn the Office of Surface 
Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, is required to take environmental 
justice into consideration when making decisions.193 In 1994, former President 
Clinton signed an Executive Order ensuring that “each Federal agency shall 
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and 
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health 
 
 190 Gina McCarthy, TSCA Reform: A Bipartisan Milestone to Protect Our Health from Dangerous 
Chemicals, EPA (June 2016), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2016/06/tsca-reform-a-bipartisan-milestone-to-protect-
our-health-from-dangerous-chemicals/.  
 191 See David Deganian & Justine Thompson, The Patterns of Pollution: A Report on Demographics and 
Pollution in Metro Atlanta 3 (Mar. 2012), https://greenlaw.org/pdf/PatternsofPollutionFINALGreenLaw3-26-
2012.pdf.  
 192 A study from The Mountain Association for Community Economic Development found that:  
While coal employment has brought decent jobs and wages to a region in desperate need of 
employment opportunities, eastern Kentucky remains one of the most economically distressed 
regions in the country. The poverty rate in Appalachian Kentucky was nearly double that of the 
nation in 2000. Even within eastern Kentucky, coal-producing counties are among the most 
economically distressed counties. The top coal-producing counties have some of the highest 
poverty rates in the region.  
Economic Status of Coal Producing Counties, MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.maced.org/coal/coal-counties.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).  
 193 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 C.F.R. § 32 (Feb. 1994). 
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or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority 
populations and low-income populations.”194 Each federal agency is required 
to have an Environmental Justice Strategic Plan in which they outline how they 
will fight for Environmental Justice.195 The Department of the Interior is 
charged with SMCRA permits and is not excepted from the scope of the 
Environmental Justice Executive Order.196 The Office of Surface Mining and 
Reclamation, allowing coal companies to self-bond their environmental 
reclamation liabilities, is not in line with preventing “adverse environmental 
impacts . . . through integration into its programs [and] policies.”197 
Unfortunately, the Executive Order’s permissive language does not provide a 
strong enforcement mechanism and is commonly skirted by agencies.198  
A bill amending SMCRA, disallowing self-bonding, would assume the 
policy behind the Executive Order and force coal companies to internalize 
clean-up costs. The benefits of factoring in environmental justice when 
considering the proposed bill extend beyond remediating current harms, but it 
will work to prevent future inequality as well. While not mandated, Congress 
should consider the environmental justice implications when deciding on the 
proposed bill to eliminate self-bonding. The bill would both relieve the 
government from the risk of incurring environmental liabilities while 
protecting the people that live in mining communities, who are susceptible to 
environmental injustice.  
Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to passing a complete ban on self-
bonding. Because the ban on self-bonding would arise from the bankruptcy 
context, the action may run afoul of § 525. The bill would be comparable to the 
carve-out in the Code in denying a previous debtor of a mining permit.199 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Environmental Justice, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oepc/resources/ 
environmental-justice (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). The Department of the Interior takes the stance on 
Environmental Justice that:  
While the Department is committed to protecting the environment and health of all 
communities, the Department’s environmental justice strategy is particularly focused on 
ensuring that minority and low-income communities do not suffer from disproportionate 
adverse environmental impacts. Ultimately, the Department strives to achieve its environmental 
justice goals through integration into its programs, policies, and activities to help ensure all 
people—including minority and low-income populations—receive fair treatment and the 
opportunity to engage and meaningfully inform the Department’s decision-making processes. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 C.F.R. § 7629 (Feb. 1994). 
 199 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012). 
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Policy concerns also arise from removing self-bonding entirely. Complete 
removal of self-bonds will force financially stable companies to put aside 
assets that were previously liquid. The declining coal market is one of the 
major reasons financially unstable companies should set aside sufficient 
reclamation bonds; yet, in light of the current health of the coal market, now is 
the worst time for a stable coal company to lose liquidity.  
The court must weigh the policies between remediating the environmental 
harm and justice concerns, with market projections and impacts, when 
evaluating whether to support the bill amending SMCRA. Like any balancing 
test, it is difficult to weigh human injustices against economic factors. The 
trends show that while the coal market is beginning to be out-competed, 
environmental justice concerns are on the rise. It is not likely that the court can 
save the coal industry any more than President Trump can, but it can support 
the SMCRA amendments in an effort to right the wrongs occurring to 
American citizens and their homes.  
2. Endorse Amendment to Permitting Regulations 
Similar to supporting the SMCRA amendments, the bankruptcy court could 
advocate for the Department of the Interior and the Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSMRE”) to change the regulations regarding 
the issuance of self-bonding permits. The OSMRE has already undergone 
notice and comment rulemaking and promulgated an amendment to its 
regulations for reclamation bonds.200 The stated goals of rulemaking would in 
fact improve the self-bonding situation by making qualifications stricter rather 
than a blanket ban.201 But just recently, Congress has invoked the 
 
 200 Press Release, supra note 84. For the notice and comment rulemaking period, OSMRE has set the 
goal to:  
(1) Modify self-bonding eligibility standards, including for parent and other corporate 
guarantors, to include criteria that are more forward looking, instead of only focusing narrowly 
on past performance; (2) Provide for an independent third party review of self-bonded entities’ 
annual financial reports and certification of the current and future financial health of self-
bonded entities; (3) Establish the percentage of all self-bonds to be supported by collateral that 
is not subject to any other lien or used as collateral for any other liability; (4) Provide 
diversification for financial assurance/reclamation bonds for each mine to prevent a single 
entity from providing 100% of the bond for a mine (except for cash bonds); (5) Provide 
regulatory authorities with better tools for obtaining replacement bonds when a self-bonding 
entity no longer meets the self-bonding eligibility criteria; and (6) Minimize the risks associated 
with corporate sureties that rely on a cash flow basis to cover the cost of reclamation when its 
bonds are forfeited. 
 201 Id. 
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Congressional Review Act and rejected the OSMRE’s amended regulation, 
thus leaving the previous and weaker regulations still in force.202 OSMRE’s 
action proves the deficiency of the self-bonding regulations. Additionally, 
Congress’s subsequent attempt to veto stronger rules reinforces the need for 
bankruptcy to play a role in the implementation of self-bonds. The status of the 
new regulations remains unclear, but if they are vetoed under the current 
administration, the need for stricter regulations in the future will be even 
stronger. 
3. Endorse the Carve-Out Proposed Herein 
Perhaps the most effective change the bankruptcy court could endorse is 
the carve-out proposed in this Comment to the Code regarding self-bonding. 
Creating a carve-out would provide the best of both worlds. It would allow 
financially responsible, resilient, and diverse companies to benefit from not 
having to set aside specific reclamation funds while also reducing the risk of a 
company that misused the bonds from availing themselves of it again. 
Suggesting or even holding that a previous bankruptcy debtor could never 
refile for a self-bond could be a step in the right direction. Moreover, making a 
call to Congress to amend the Code may be the option most within the scope of 
a bankruptcy court’s powers. Support for a change in the Code from 
bankruptcy judges—those that deal with the Code the most—would have a 
persuasive impact on Congress to enact a carve-out for irresponsible self-
bonding.  
The existing framework of the Code as well as SMCRA are insufficient to 
tame the nation’s billion-dollar problem of self-bonding. Bankruptcy courts 
should use their influence and expertise to call on Congress to change the 
future of human health and environmental degradation caused by under-funded 
mine reclamations. In doing so, the court will have to weigh policies such as 
efficiency of Congressional action, environmental justice, energy market 
economics, and feasibility of proposed actions and rulemaking. Forming a 
position on how bankruptcy can affect the uncertainty and harms arising from 
self-bonding and tactical litigation could go a long way in moving the practice 
in the right direction.  
 
 202 See Stream Protection Rule, supra note 60. 
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CONCLUSION 
Coal mining companies are self-bonding, declaring bankruptcy, and 
leaving an environmental mess with no one responsible for clean-up. Families 
in coal mining regions, like Lindytown, West Virginia, are forced to stay and 
deal with the hazards of coal mining, or become displaced from their homes. 
Coal is becoming a less popular source of power, and an industry that used to 
employ American citizens is relying less and less on human labor.  
As the global and domestic markets shift, the current regulations are no 
longer effective at protecting people and the environment. SMCRA is too 
lenient because it allows too many companies to self-bond, either before or 
after bankruptcy, and it allows companies to inappropriately rely upon their 
subsidiaries. SMCRA does not sufficiently disincentivize abuse of its limited 
requirements, especially when it comes to self-reporting. This problem is on a 
fast track to becoming an epidemic. As more coal companies go under, more 
mines will be abandoned without the necessary environmental clean-up, 
leaving surrounding communities to suffer the harms of dirty air and water for 
generations to come.  
Bankruptcy highlights a major predicament that self-bonding can place 
both a coal company and a permitting agency in. The policy behind self-
bonding in support of allowing coal companies to not set aside reclamation 
funds because they are sufficiently solvent is backfiring. The code regulating 
the requirements for self-bonding makes it clear that a financially troubled 
company headed toward bankruptcy must provide alternate bonds with 
sufficient collateral. But the act of replacing self-bonds is not working in 
practice, as demonstrated by the bankruptcy proceedings of some of the 
country’s largest coal companies.  
There could be various reasons why a coal company, such as Alpha 
Natural Resources, has to file for bankruptcy before having the opportunity to 
replace its self-bonded environmental liabilities. Allowing companies to self-
bond through their subsidiaries seems to be the start of the financial issues 
surrounding reclamation bonds. Historical patterns of the coal market show 
that the market was resilient, and temporarily self-bonding through an affiliate 
was more cost effective than replacing self-bonds until financially qualifying 
again.203 Due to various market pressures (including an increase of renewable 
resources, federal response to climate change, and a decrease in international 
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demand), the coal industry may not rebound like it has in the past.204 
Companies that have out self-bonded their liabilities, either in good faith that 
the market would recover, or in an attempt to avoid incurring costs or 
bankruptcy, are finding themselves in real trouble and unable to remain 
financially stable. 
Just as bankruptcy brings the problem to light, the process can play 
multiple roles when a coal company files for chapter 11 and either has 
inadequate reclamation self-bonds or could potentially post them in the future. 
The Code could provide some relief as it stands. Under the bankruptcy 
requirements of reorganization plan approval, a debtor must have a plan that 
will “in good faith” accomplish the interests of creditors feasibly.205  
In the case of a coal company that could requalify for self-bonds, or 
achieve self-bonding status through a subsidiary, there may be questions of the 
feasibility of the plan in the long run and raise issues of good faith. The 
safeguard of § 1129(a)(11) could likely bolster the potential to use 
§ 1129(a)(3) against inadequate self-bonding. Section 1129(a)(11) sets a 
feasibility standard that requires a plan offer reasonable assurance, probability, 
or prospect of success.206 Under that definition, either the current or potential 
self-bonding comports with § 1129(a)(3), or the plan is not financially feasible 
and therefore could not have been made in good faith.207 If, however, it cut the 
other way and a court found a plan to be feasible, it in no way could be stopped 
by allegations of bad faith. 
A revision to the Code could strengthen the policy behind preventing 
dangerous self-bonds. If the Code prevented companies with a history of 
financial troubles and bankruptcy from receiving a permit under a self-bond, it 
would provide financially stable coal companies with the benefit of a self-
bond, while protecting the public from the possibility of having to pick up the 
slack from a financially unstable company with inadequate reclamation self-
bonds. The proposed carve-out would balance avoiding the shutdown of the 
coal industry in the United States, with disallowing abuse of the bankruptcy 
system to avoid reclamation liabilities. 
The bankruptcy court could also play a role in resolving the issue by 
making a call to Congress. The problem would be best solved at the source, by 
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amending SMCRA to ban self-bonding all together, yet the current political 
situation in Congress may pose a barrier to change in a timely manner. Taking 
a page from Justice O’Connor, the most effective thing a bankruptcy court 
could do is to promote change to the Code. Although this would also require 
action by Congress, recognition of the issue as specific to bankruptcy may 
push change along. A change to the Code to provide for an exception to self-
bonding would be favorable to an outright ban under SMCRA. Allowing 
flexibility would uphold the policies behind self-bonding as well as prevent 
abuse.  
Lastly, the court could support the rulemaking process underway by the 
OSMRE.208 This option may be the quickest and politically safest option, but 
not likely the most effective way to combat the nationwide issue. The issues 
arising from the current energy market and longstanding environmental justice 
concerns call for action to be taken to assure sufficient clean-up of used coal 
mines.  
No matter the mechanism used, bankruptcy can play a vital role in 
resolving current and future harms to both the environment and people. As the 
energy market changes in response to pressure from consumers and competing 
energy sources, the way the coal industry operates needs to adjust to handle 
operations more responsibly. Bankruptcy has increasingly become a forum for 
coal companies to regroup and restructure; making the institution a ripe place 
to make business practices more responsible. 
Environmental degradation and harm to human health are not limited to the 
coal industry. At a broader level, the analysis could be used outside the context 
of coal companies and self-bonding. A large amount of environmental burdens 
that fall within the hands of the government arise from bankruptcy.209 The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), for example, gives the Environmental Protection Agency the 
authority to mandate clean-up of hazardous waste sites.210 CERCLA has an 
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established fund from the government to take care of clean-up costs of sites 
contaminated with dangerous pollutants. CERCLA has a limited budget and a 
growing number of sites obtained through bankruptcy and abandonment.211 
And in the face of the recent election, the EPA may have even less support for 
site clean-up.212 The degrading process could look to the Code for help.  
In a manner similar to how bankruptcy could alleviate some pressure from 
the rising problem of self-bonding for coal companies, looking at how gaps can 
be filled in the Code can provide a blueprint for reducing the American 
taxpayer’s share of the abandoned environmental liabilities from other federal 
statutes as well.  
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